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A Cold Night: Unconscionability as a
Defense to Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in
Employment Agreements
MICHAEL SCHNEIDEREIT*

[The law is] like a single-bed blanket on a double bed and three folks
in the bed and a cold night. There ain't ever enough blanket to cover
the case, no matter how much pulling and hauling, and somebody is
always going to nigh catch pneumonia.... The law is always too short
and too tight for growing humankind. The best you can do is do something and then make up some law to fit and by the time that law gets
on the books you would have done something different.t
INTRODUCTION

This Note uses a California Court of Appeals case, Mercuro v. Superior Court,' as a launching point for an examination of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts. After summarizing Mercuro, it
considers the history of arbitration in the United States since 1925, taking
note of several landmark United States Supreme Court cases that altered
the jurisdictional relationship between the courts and arbitration. Next, it
examines the arguments that have been marshaled in opposition to the
current state of arbitration jurisprudence, including those professing
support from empirical research. This section outlines the basic problems
with mandatory employment arbitration. Third, it searches down several
avenues, particularly those of the United States Supreme Court and the
legislature, for a potential solution to the alleged problem. Finally, it examines and assesses the viability of the solution crafted by the California
Supreme Court.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004; B.A., University
of California, Santa Cruz, 2ooo. This Note originated from Professor Charles L. Knapp's "Case Studies
in Contracts" seminar. I would like to thank Professor Knapp for his guidance both in that class and in
first-year Contracts. Thanks also to Celeste Evans and Peter Schneidereit for their kind support.
t ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING'S MEN, 136 (Harcourt Brace & Co. 1984) (1946).
i. 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
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I. A CASE STUDY: MERCURO V. SUPERIOR COURT
In the spring of i997, Countrywide Securities Corporation presented
certain employees with an arbitration agreement.2 The agreement required signatories to "knowingly and voluntarily" 3 waive their right to a
jury trial and submit certain employment-related disputes to arbitration.
Countrywide offered twenty-five shares of its stock or one extra day of
vacation in exchange for signing the agreement. Fred Mercuro, a securities broker for Countrywide, chose not to sign, claiming that the consideration was inadequate.
Unfortunately for Mercuro, subsequent events demonstrated that
Countrywide did not intend for him to have a choice. Mercuro was first
told by his superiors that he "did not have the option of not signing the
agreement" and that he "would find it difficult to make a living at Countrywide" 4 if he did not sign. Countrywide further suggested that his refusal to sign might be explained by the fact that he "was not generationally compatible with the other salesmen. ' He was told that
Countrywide's corporate attorney was "livid about [his] refusal to sign
the arbitration agreement" and that Countrywide's Chief Executive Officer regretted hiring "this S.O.B" who "had caused him considerable
grief." Mercuro was threatened with removal of his accounts, nonapproval of his road trips, and "whatever action was necessary to drive
[him] out."7 Countrywide's Chief Operating Officer confirmed to Mercuro that the CEO and corporate attorney were planning to "drive [him]
out, making it all but impossible [for him] to make a living" and leaving
him "in California with no income and litigating a court case which
would take years to resolve." 8 No doubt this was a bitter pill for Mercuro,
who was fifty-two years old at the time and had moved from Florida to
California only one year earlier.'
Mercuro eventually yielded and signed the agreement.'" He later asserted that he had signed the agreement under duress and coercion, explaining that it was "clear that I had to sign [the agreement] in order to

2.

Id. at 674.

3. Id.

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.at 674-75.
7. Id.at 675.
8. Id.

9. Id. at 676.
io. Id. at 675.
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save my job at Countrywide ....I felt so desperate that I finally signed
the agreement.""
After leaving Countrywide in March 2000, Mercuro filed an action
charging Countrywide with "numerous employment-related torts including age and disability discrimination, fraud, and wrongful termination in
violation of public policy."' 2 In response, Countrywide filed a motion to
compel arbitration pursuant to the agreement Mercuro had signed. The
Superior Court granted the motion to compel, and Mercuro appealed the
decision. "
The Court of Appeal found the arbitration agreement unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.14 Under California law, two elements
must be proven to establish a defense of unconscionability: procedural
unconscionability and substantive unconscionability. The court first
found the agreement procedurally unconscionable. Citing from Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.,'" a California Supreme Court decision, the court defined procedural unconscionability as
"adhesiveness-a set of circumstances in which the weaker or 'adhering'
party is presented a contract drafted by the stronger party on a take it or
leave it basis.' 6 The court found a high degree of procedural unconscionability because of Countrywide's "highly oppressive conduct"' 7 in
securing Mercuro's signature. Evidence of Countrywide's threats and the
fact that Mercuro was fifty-two years old and had only recently moved to
California strongly support the court's finding.

II.

Id.

12. Id. at 673.
13. As an aside, it is interesting to contemplate why Mercuro was so firmly set against signing the

arbitration agreement. His unwillingness to do so certainly evinces a level of sophistication and understanding not common to the average employee. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration:
"One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 759, 769 (2OO) ("[E]mployees typically learn about crucial issues such as dispute resolution mechanisms.., a substantial amount of time
after beginning employment.") (citing David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships,
104 HARv. L. REv. 375 (i990)). Then again, the fact that his recalcitrance so raised the hackles of
Countrywide's highest ranking officers indicates that he probably was more valuable and possibly
more sophisticated than the average employee. Given the evident bad blood between Mercuro and
those officers, one can speculate that Mercuro may have already decided to sue Countrywide at the
time he was presented with the arbitration agreement. He may have waited until March of 2000 to sue
because he had a fixed-term employment contract. If so, he could not have quit earlier without being
in breach. This might also explain why Countrywide, rather than simply firing Mercuro, was forced
instead to threaten his benefits within the company.
14. Mercuro, s16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675.
i5. 6 P.3d 669, 689 (Cal. 2000).
16. Mercuro, I16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676.
17. Id.
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The court noted that the presence of a high degree of procedural unconscionability meant that Mercuro would have to make only a "minimal
showing" of substantive unconscionability to avoid enforcement.' 8
Under Armendariz, substantive unconscionability can be established
by "overly harsh" or "one-sided" terms in an agreement. 9 Mercuro made
two arguments in attempting to establish substantive unconscionability.
First, he contended that the agreement was unfairly one-sided because it
excluded from arbitration claims for injunctive or equitable relief for intellectual property violations, unfair competition, and unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information." These were all
claims that Countrywide was likely to bring. Yet the agreement required
arbitration of almost all of Mercuro's potential claims." For example,
Mercuro would have to arbitrate any disputes relating to breach of express or implied contracts or covenants, tort claims, claims of discrimination based on race, sex, age or disability, or claims for violations of any
federal, state or other governmental constitution, statute, ordinance,
regulation or public policy." Agreeing with Mercuro, the court noted
that, under Armendariz, substantive unconscionability could be established if the stronger party to an arbitration agreement was given a
choice of forum while the weaker party was forced to arbitrate all
claims. 3 The court rejected Countrywide's arguments that the agreement
was not one-sided because Mercuro was exempted from arbitrating
worker's compensation and unemployment benefits claim. 4 The court
explained that "neither [worker's compensation nor unemployment
benefits claims are] a proper subject for arbitration." 5

i8. Id. This rule is indeed very useful to a court wishing to invalidate a mandatory agreement to
arbitrate employment claims because such agreements will almost always have an element of adhesiveness, and hence procedural unconscionability. In Stirlen v. Supercuts, 6o Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 147
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997), for example, the California Supreme Court found that a high-ranking executive
who had been courted by Supercuts was nevertheless the victim of procedural unconscionability. Such
a broad approach is not necessarily unjust, since the proliferation of form agreements can result in a
diminution of choice even for relatively powerful employees. As one prominent scholar has noted,
"[s]hopping [for more favorable contracts] can protect shoppers only when it is a widespread activity."
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1229
(1983). In other words, even an employee with significant bargaining power will find it difficult to
wriggle out of a form agreement if no other employee has been able to do so.
i9.Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 69o.
20. Mercuro, i 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677.
21. Id. at 676.
22. Id. at 677.
23. Id.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
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The court also rejected Countrywide's argument that it had a reasonable business justification for the exemption. Under Stirlen 6 and Armendariz,"7 it is not unconscionable for a party with superior bargaining
strength to insert contractual terms that provide it with "extra protection" not afforded to the opposing party so long as there is a legitimate
need for those terms." Countrywide claimed that it had a legitimate
commercial need to get effective relief for intellectual property violations, but could not do so through arbitration since arbitral tribunals are
unable to grant equitable or injunctive relief. 9 However, the Mercuro
court noted that, under the Code of Civil Procedure, a court may grant
provisional injunctive relief to a party involved in arbitration." The court
concluded that because Countrywide could get provisional injunctive relief from a court, it had not shown that it had a legitimate commercial
need for the exemption.'
Mercuro is a useful case from which to start assessing the enforcement of mandatory employment arbitration contracts because it has an
emotional impact. A classic power relationship is at its core: the large,
callous corporation on one side, versus the relatively powerless, isolated
employee on the other. The decision feels just. Yet had Mercuro been
decided in a different jurisdiction, the outcome may well have been different. The California court's finding of procedural unconscionability in
Mercuro would likely be sustained in any jurisdiction, but the finding of
substantive unconscionability, premised as it was on mutuality of remedy, is a finding peculiar to California courts. Had Mercuro brought his
case in another jurisdiction, the arbitration clause would likely have been
enforced. The reasons for this are explored in more detail below. For
now, it will suffice to keep Mercuro in mind as a moral keel with which to
navigate the cold doctrine that is mandatory employment arbitration jurisprudence.
II. FROM DAVID TO GOLIATH: THE HISTORY OF
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

It is essential to understand the history of arbitration in America to
appreciate the quandary that the California state courts presently face.
Modern American arbitration jurisprudence traces its history to 1925,
when Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").32 Prior to
26. 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).

27. 6 P.3d 669,691 (Cal. 2ooo).
28. Id.
29. Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677.
30. Id. at 678.
31. Id.
32.

Codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ I-16 (1994).
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that time, common law courts in both England and America would not
enforce agreements to arbitrate, believing that they "ousted" jurisdiction
from the courts at a time when dockets still thirsted for cases.33 However,
the burgeoning mercantile interests of the early 20th century outweighed
the predilections of the judiciary,34 and the FAA was passed, declaring
arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."35
Since 1925, the United States Supreme Court has issued a line of
cases interpreting the FAA.36 A landmark among these cases is Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,3 which signaled the advent of
the Court's pro-arbitration stance. In Prima Paint,the Court propounded
the legal fiction that an arbitration agreement could be "separa[ted]"3S
from the remainder of a contract. This allowed an arbitrator to decide
the question of whether a contract was induced by fraud because the arbitration agreement was not itself part of the contract.39

33. See Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionabilityin the Securities Industry, 78
B.U. L. REV. 255, 263 (1998). Indeed, the House Report accompanying the FAA stated:
The need for the law arises from.., the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction.... This jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts. The
courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment.
H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924).

34. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and FederalCommercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th
Cong. 9 (1923).

35. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
36. For a time, the Supreme Court remained skeptical of arbitration, and in fact crafted a public
policy defense to mandatory agreements to arbitrate claims under section 12(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933. This defense incorporated arguments against arbitration that remain in vogue. See Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (953). Wilko was eventually overruled by Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
37. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
38. See id. at 402.

39. A noteworthy consequence the separability doctrine espoused by Prima Paint is that it favors
plaintiffs seeking court review of an unconscionability defense as opposed to a fraud defense. This is
because an unconscionability defense will more likely be directed at the arbitral process itself, and
thereby inherently attach to the arbitration clause, whereas a fraud defense will more likely be directed against the contract as a whole. Of course, occasions where a fraud defense is directed exclusively at the arbitration clause in a contract are not inconceivable (for example, if fraud is used to induce an employee's assent to a separate arbitration clause after the initial contract has been signed),
but it is on the whole less likely.
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Following Prima Paint, the Court issued a series of decisions further
establishing its new pro-arbitration bent.40 By 1983, in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., the Court concluded
that the FAA evinces "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies
to the contrary. ' 4' The decision enshrined the FAA as federal substantive
law, meaning that it could be applied in state courts under the framework
associated with Erie Railroadv. Tompkins." The Court buttressed its position in Southland Corp. v. Keating,43 holding that enactment of the
FAA was an exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power and that it
therefore superceded any conflicting state laws by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.'
In i99I, the Supreme Court decided Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.,45 the milestone case establishing the validity of mandatory
arbitration clauses in employment agreements. Gilmer held specifically
that claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA") could be subjected to mandatory arbitration. Gilmer, the petitioner, was required by his employer, the respondent, to register with
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 46 The registration application

contained an agreement to arbitrate employment claims.47 When Gilmer
was fired, he brought an age discrimination suit in federal court, and his
employer moved to compel arbitration.4
The Gilmer Court voiced in no uncertain terms its sympathy towards
arbitration. The Court relied on its legacy of pro-arbitration decisions to
establish that statutory claims are presumptively arbitrable and that the
burden is on the party seeking to avoid enforcement to show that Congress "intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum."49 The Court

40. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S 614 (985); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987). But see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Corp., 415 U.S. 36 (i974).
41. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
42. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2001).
43. 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).

44. Id.; see also Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 68i (1996) (holding that a Montana
law requiring arbitration clauses to be underlined was preempted by the FAA). The Court stated that

"[c]ourts may not ... invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration
provisions." Id. at 687; Perry v. Thomas 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps,
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
500 U.S. 20(1991).
Id. at 23.
Id,
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 26.
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concluded that Congress had not intended to preclude arbitration of
ADEA claims.
The Court flatly rejected Gilmer's objections to mandatory arbitration. First, confronted with Gilmer's contention that arbitration panels
may be biased, the Court retorted: "We decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be
unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators. ' 5 In the Court's opinion, the NYSE rules governing arbitration
would be sufficient to eliminate any potential bias.5' The Court also took
the opportunity to restrict the overturn of arbitration decisions to cases
"where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators."52
Second, the Court refused to credit Gilmer's complaint that the limits on discovery in arbitration would deprive him of a fair opportunity to
present his claims.53 The Court found that the NYSE's limits on discovery
were not unfair, and observed that limits on discovery are indeed one of
the advantages of arbitration. Second, the Court rejected Gilmer's complaint that the lack of written decisions in arbitration is unfair because it
stifles development of the law.54 The Court explained that the NYSE did
provide for written decisions, and that there will always be some claims
that go to court to provide fodder for developing the law.5 Third, the
Court found, contrary to Gilmer's assertions, that equitable relief was
available under the NYSE's arbitration rules.
Finally, the Court rejected Gilmer's argument that he was a victim of
unequal bargaining power. Observing that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power.., is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context," 6 the Court explained that allegations of unequal bargaining power should be examined
on a case by case basis. In a nod toward the doctrines of unconscionability and duress, the Court added that such allegations will support revocation of a contract if they represent "the sort of fraud or overwhelming
economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any
contract."'57 Finding Gilmer to be "an experienced businessman, ' 8 the
Court concluded that he had not been the victim of any such inequality

50. Id. at 30.

51. Id. at 30-31.
52. Id. at 30.
I

53. Id. at 3 .
54. Id. at 31-32.
55. Id. at 32.
56. Id. at 33.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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in bargaining power. Thus, Gilmer ushered in the age of mandatory employment arbitration.
Most Circuits and State courts have obediently toed the line drawn
by Gilmer. However, there have been some notable developments and
divergences. In Cole v. Burns Intl. Security Services,59 the District of Columbia Circuit wrought from Gilmer's negation of defenses to arbitration
a set of positive factors that must be present for an employment-related
arbitration agreement to be enforceable against a Title VII claim. These
factors mandate that the agreement provide neutral arbitrators, more
than minimal discovery, a written award, and all types of relief otherwise
available in court. The court further held that such agreements must not
"require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators'
'
fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum." 6
The Ninth Circuit, at least at first, interpreted Gilmer more broadly.
In a trio of cases, it attempted to salvage what it could from Gilmer's assault upon an employee's right to a jury trial. In Craft v. Campbell Soup
Co. 6, the court seized upon the distinction that Gilmer dealt not with an
employment agreement but a registration application to hold that employment agreements were exempted from the FAA.6' The court reaffirmed this holding in Circuit City Stores v. Adams.63 During its 2000
term, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Circuit City in order
to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit and all other circuits.64
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, concluding that employment
agreements are not exempt from the FAA.
This left but one rogue decision unsettled. In Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co., 6, the Ninth Circuit had held that mandatory agreements
to arbitrate Title VII and California Fair Employment and Housing Act

59. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
60. Id. at 1482 (emphasis omitted).
6i. 177 F.3d lO83 (9th Cir. 1999).

62. To reach this conclusion, the court interpreted the FAA in a historical manner. 9 U.S.C. § I
states that the FAA does not apply to "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in interstate commerce." Looking back to 1925, when the FAA
was drafted, the court observed that the commerce power was relatively narrow. Congress would not
have expected it to cover employment contracts outside of interstate commerce. So by exempting interstate workers from the FAA, Congress believed that it was exempting all employment contracts
under its authority from the FAA. All other employment contracts would have been assumed exempt
from the FAA as a matter of course because they were not within the commerce power.
The court recognized that in employing this interpretation of the FAA it was at odds with the
majority of circuits, which interpreted the FAA in accordance with the current breadth of the commerce power. Craft, 177 F.3d at io85-87.
63. 194 F.3d Io7o (9th Cir. 1999).
64. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 1O5 (2OO).
65. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
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66
("FEHA") claims could not be imposed as a condition of employment.
However, in EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, the Ninth
Circuit felt compelled to abandon the Duffield outpost, recognizing
the
67
patent conflict with the Supreme Court's opinion in Circuit City.
With the abandonment of Duffield, the last vestige of a defense to
mandatory arbitration of employment contracts in California lies with
state contract law. The FAA states that arbitration agreements may be
revoked "upon such rounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." This leaves open the defenses of duress and, perhaps more significantly, unconscionability. 69 Indeed, on remand, the
Ninth Circuit in Circuit City was able to retreat to state principles of unconscionability to rescind the arbitration agreement at issue.'

III. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Before evaluating possible solutions to the problem of mandatory
employment arbitration, the basic problems associated with such agreements must be acknowledged. Fortunately for this purpose at least, there
is no dearth of criticism leveled at mandatory employment arbitration.
What follows is only a brief survey of some of the more prominent complaints.
First, it has been argued that the majority of mandatory employment
arbitration agreements are contracts of adhesion.7' Prospective employees have no real choice but to sign such agreements, because the alternative would likely be loss of the offer of employment. Most employees
first encounter a mandatory arbitration clause at the moment they are
being hired. It comes nestled somewhere within the boilerplate type of
the employment contract, the fruit of their job search. They are told that
66. In a creative opinion, the court reasoned that language in the Civil Rights Act of i991, Pub. L.
No. 102-66, § it8, 1O5 Stat. io8i (199i), stating that "[wihere appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including.., arbitration, is encouraged
to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title" evidenced a Congressional intent to prohibit mandatory arbitration. The court reasoned that mandatory
arbitration would in fact limit the choice of forum, thereby contradicting the stated intent of encouraging alternative fora for dispute resolution. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1189-120o, overruled by E.E.O.C.
v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F-3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 2003).
67. 345 F.3d 742, 749 (9th Cir 2003) (en banc).
68. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)69. Unconscionability is a more likely defense to mandatory arbitration because, as discussed in
more detail below, it is a more open and inclusive standard. To meet a claim of duress, a plaintiff must
show (I)a wrongful or improper threat, (2) a lack of reasonable alternative, and (3)actual inducement
of the contract by the threat. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 175 (1981).
70. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2002).
71. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1036 (1996) ("Many pre-hire

arbitral agreements are blatant contracts of adhesion.").
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they must sign the agreement in order to get the job. Perhaps they read
the agreement before signing, perhaps not. Even if they do, they are
unlikely to understand its implications.7" And if they are familiar with the
implications, they still are unlikely to challenge the inclusion of an arbitration clause, for they are at the honeymoon stage of their relationship
with their employer and do not wish to chill any feet.73 Furthermore, the
employer would be unlikely to succumb to such a challenge even were it
made, unless the employee were in a position of uncommon bargaining
power.
Yet the fact that a mandatory arbitration agreement is a contract of
adhesion does not, by itself, render the agreement unenforceable.74 Nevertheless, a finding that a mandatory arbitration agreement is a contract
of adhesion provides valuable ammunition for a defense of procedural
unconscionability.7 5
A second criticism, directed at the arbitration process itself, is that
plaintiff-employees may suffer from a bias in arbitration towards "repeat
players." 6 Because employers are inevitably engaged in arbitration more
often than employees, they acquire a degree of experience and familiarity in dealing with the arbitration procedure. Employers thereby gain
added familiarity with arbitrators, advantages due to economies of scale,
and a greater interest in the large-scale picture of how arbitration is conducted.77 This greater interest in turn motivates employers to lobby and
pursue other avenues of political influence in ensuring that the interest is
protected.
Another asserted failure of arbitration is that it neither creates nor
adheres to precedent, and often requires no written judgments. 78 There is
therefore no public record by which to examine trends in decisions, nor is

72. See Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-DisputeMandatory
Arbitration Agreements at the ContractingStage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1231 (discussing
how employees rely on inaccurate heuristics to evaluate agreements to arbitrate).

73. Id. at 1235.

74. Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664, 68o (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that a mandatory arbitration agreement is "not rendered unenforceable just because it

is required as a condition of employment or offered on a 'take it or leave it' basis").
75. Since a finding of procedural unconscionability requires that the assenting party had no real
choice but to assent, a contract of adhesion will almost certainly satisfy that requirement. See, e.g.,
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689 (Cal. 2000).
76. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players,Adhesive Contracts,and the Use of Statistics in
JudicialReview of Employment ArbitrationAwards, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 223, 239 (998); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 95, 97 (1974).
77. Bingham, supra note 76, at 241.
78. See, e.g., Susan A. Fitzgibbon, Teaching Unconscionability Through Agreements to Arbitrate
Employment Claims, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1401, 1410 (2000).
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there a means of monitoring the decisions. This is a particularly salient
criticism with respect to arbitration of civil rights claims, where public
knowledge of violations and penalties is crucial to ensure deterrence and
supervision. A further rights-based complaint is that mandatory arbitration denies the plaintiff the fundamental right to a jury trial. 79 The rebuttal here is simply that the plaintiff has assented to the agreement, thereby
voluntarily relinquishing the right to a jury. Nonetheless, not all assents
are voluntary, and adhesive contracts still pose a problem in this regard.
Limits on discovery commonly imposed in arbitration have also come
under fire." However they are also a mainstay of pro-arbitration arguments because they speed the arbitral process.
One might hope that sheer empirical data could cut through the arguments and perhaps point the way towards a solution. Unfortunately, as
seems to be the case with many of the knottiest legal problems, such data
is spotty and inconclusive, tending to support both sides of the debate.
Data can be apparently assembled either to show that arbitration is
clearly unfair,8, or the exact opposite,8 ' depending on how it is spun.
79. See, e.g., Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 354 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) ("Faced with the issue of whether a unilateral obligation to arbitrate is unconscionable, we con-

clude that it is. The party who is required to submit his or her claims to arbitration foregoes the right,
otherwise guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions, to have those claims tried before a

jury.").
80. See, e.g., Fitzgibbon, supra note 78, at 1410.
81. See, e.g., Paul L. Edenfield, No More the Independent and Virtuous Judiciary?:TriagingAntidiscrimination Policy in a Post-Gilmer World, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1321, 1330 (2002) (claiming that an
early 199os study "showed employees won sixty-eight percent of the time in court, and only twentyeight percent in arbitration"); Bingham, supra note 76, at 234 (presenting statistics showing that
"[e]mployees ...have significantly lower outcomes in cases involving repeat player employers");
Katherine Eddy, To Every Remedy A Wrong: The Confounding of Civil Liberties Through Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts,52 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 777 (2001) (stating that plaintiffemployees are "estimated to win nearly 70% of the 25,000 wrongful discharge and discrimination cases
filed in state and federal courts nationwide, with the average jury award at approximately $700,000").
82. See, e.g., Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 29, 47 (1998) (presenting data that employee-plaintiffs only won forty-four
percent of jury verdicts in 1994, and that, of all employment discrimination cases brought in 1994, sixty
percent were disposed of by pre-trial motion, won by employers ninety-eight percent of the time).
Maltby also cites to an early 199os study showing that plaintiff-employees won sixty-eight percent of
cases in arbitration as opposed to twenty-eight percent in trial. Id. at 49; U.S. GEN. ACcT. OFF., ALTERNATIVE Disp. RESOL.: EMPLOYERS' EXPERIENCE WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 19 (1997) (presenting
evidence that at least one company reported that the overall cost of ADR was less than half of the cost
of litigating employment disputes); Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage
from Using Mandatory Arbitrationfor DiscriminationClaims, 31 RUrGERS L.J. 399, 450 (2000) (arguing that criticism of arbitration "loses its sting" in light of statistics showing a severe backlog of employment cases filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); Matthew Struble, Are
All Contracts of Employment Exempt from the Provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act?: The Supreme Court Settles the Matter,67 Mo. L. REV. 65 , 682 (2002).
Of the employment discrimination cases in federal district court in 1994, employees won an
abysmal 14.9% of the time. On the other hand, the mean damages awarded to those em-
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IV.
A.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AS THE SOURCE OF A SOLUTION

If one's reading were confined to Supreme Court opinions of the
past quarter-century, it may seem that criticism of mandatory arbitration
is the province of malcontents. That to complain about arbitration being
inferior to the courts is like complaining about the telephone being inferior to letter-writing-an atavism."s It is as if the Court remains reluctant
to tweeze out the shortcomings of employment arbitration lest it causes
the entire fabric of arbitration to unravel. Perhaps such exaggerated regard for arbitration could once have been justified as offsetting the bias
against underprivileged arbitration. But in an age where corporations
send sixty-two percent of their employment disputes to arbitration,8 such
a justification is disingenuous. Neither does the Court's devout invocation of the FAA's stated purpose of placing arbitration agreements "on
the same footing as other contracts" ring altogether true. Legislative history reveals that the FAA was intended to apply only to agreements between commercial entities and not in the employment context.' Add to
this the Court's summary dismissal of criticisms of employment arbitration, 86 and its position borders on denial.
In Gilmer, for example, the Court refused to "indulge" Gilmer's argument concerning the "repeat player effect.""8 In so refusing, the Court
paid no heed to the significant research and literature establishing the
repeat player effect as a genuine handicap for first-time plaintiffs suing
their employees. 88 Instead, the Court relied upon an apparent intuition
that arbitrators will abide by rules of fair-play set out for them. Of

ployees was in excess of $5oo,ooo. Mean damages awarded to successful employee claimants
in arbitration cases decided by the American Arbitration Association from 1993 to 1995 was
a mere $49,o3o; however, employees won in sixty-three percent of arbitrations. Thus, while
awards were typically smaller than in litigation, employees who arbitrated were far more
likely to obtain relief.
Id.
83. This notion is apparent in the Gilmer Court's refusal to "indulge" skepticism about the fairness of arbitration proceedings. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 5oo U.S. 20,30 (1991).
84. See David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Top General Counsels Support ADR: Fortunewoo
Lawyers Comment on Its Status and Future,8 Bus. L. TODAY 24, 26 (Mar./Apr. 1999).
85. See David S.Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 75-76 (1997); see also
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3 d 1182, 1196 (9th Cir. 1998).
86. See Gilmer, 5oo U.S. at 20, in which the Court rejected four of the most prominent arguments
against employment arbitration in three scant pages. The arguments claimed that employment arbitration was flawed because of (1)the repeat player effect, (2) the limits on discovery, (3) the lack of written awards, and (4)the inequality in bargaining power. Id. at 30-33.
87. Id. at 30.
88. See Bingham, supra note 76, at 238.
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course, such faith in arbitrators ignores the possibility that an arbitrator
could be influenced by an unconscious bias.
The Court's dismissal of Gilmer's claim that he was the victim of unequal bargaining power was equally perfunctory. The Court justified its89
reasoning by noting that Gilmer was "an experienced businessman,"
thereby placing the burden on Gilmer to demonstrate the presence of
unequal bargaining power. A more realistic assessment might have
placed the burden on Gilmer's employer to show that Gilmer had a real
choice in the matter.' In all, the Supreme Court is not the place to look
for acknowledgement of the problem. Having built its castle in the sky, it
is unlikely that the Supreme Court will reverse its position on employment arbitration in the near future.
B.

THE LEGISLATURE AS THE SOURCE OF A SOLUTION

Neither may it be prudent to hold out for a legislative fix.9' In February of 2002, California Senate Bill 1538 was introduced,92 proposing to
"invalidate predispute arbitration agreements between employers and
employees" that related to FEHA, 9 and to prohibit employers from requiring employees to sign mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition of employment. 4 On September io, 2002, Governor Gray Davis vetoed the bill, explaining that "in these difficult economic times I am not
prepared to place additional burdens on employers by preventing them
'
from requiring alternative dispute resolution of employment claims."95
Governor Davis was given another opportunity to invalidate pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate FEHA claims in October 2003, during his lameduck period, when AB 1715 was introduced. 6 However, he once again
refused to do so, saying that he was "concerned about adversely affecting
89. Gilmer,500 U.S. at 33.
o
9 . See, e.g., Stirlen v. Supercuts, 6o Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that appellant, a high-level executive nonetheless had no real choice when signing an employment agreement
requiring arbitration); Rakoff, supra note 18, at 1176 (arguing that form terms in contracts of adhesion
should be presumptively unenforceable).
91. See, e.g., Fitzgibbon, supra note 78, at 141o ("[A legislative intention to restrict resolution of
employment claims to courts] does not appear to be a priority on the congressional agenda."); David
Sherwyn et al., InDefense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 125

("[L]egislation [that would] ban mandatory arbitration agreements ...[has] never come close to being
enacted.").
92. S. 1538, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Governor Gray Davis, Veto message to the Members of the California State Senate (Sept. 30,
2oo2), availableat http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/oi-o2/bill/sen/sb_-151o-I55o/sb-1538-vt-2002o 9 3 o.html
96. Davis Vetoes Bill Limiting Employment Arbitration Agreements, METROPOLITAN NEWSENTERPRISE (L.A.), Oct. 14, 2003, at 3.
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the ability of California business to cost efficiently resolve disputes."97
These instances underscore the highly-charged political and economic
nature of the mandatory arbitration issue."
C.

CALIFORNIA STATE UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE AS A SOLUTION

Armendariz v. FoundationHealth Psychcare Services, Inc.," the case
upon which Mercuro relies, established the California state court approach to invalidating mandatory employment arbitration agreements
through unconscionability. In Armendariz, two plaintiffs sued their employer, claiming violations under FEHA and other causes of action.'"
The employer moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause in the employees' employment contract.'"' The court began by assessing the arbitrability of FEHA claims under the D.C. Circuit's Cole factors. The court then considered the presence of substantive
unconscionability in the agreement.
i. Application of the Cole Factorsin Armendariz and After
In the first part of its opinion, the California Supreme Court borrowed the Cole factors' 2 developed by the D.C. Circuit to decide
whether or not to compel arbitration of the FEHA claims."° The court
found that by limiting the available remedies to back pay, and requiring
the employees to share the costs of arbitration,' 4 the agreement violated
two of the five Cole factors. Accordingly, the court declined to compel
97. Id.
98. At bottom, the arbitration issue is a political one. A truly satisfying fix can come only from
the United States Supreme Court or the Legislature. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts
Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 798 (2002). Professor Knapp
further points out that the Supreme Court's stance on mandatory arbitration is essentially a political
one.
99. 6 P.3 d 669 (Cal. 2000).
too. Id. at 675.
ioi. Id. The Cole factors state that an agreement to arbitrate is lawful so long as it: (i) provides for
neutral arbitrators; (2) provides for more than minimal discovery; (3) requires a written award; (4)
provides for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court; and (5) does not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrator's fees or expenses as a condition of
access to the arbitration forum. Id. at 102 (citing Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., io5 F.3d 1465, 1482
(D.C. Cir. 1997))102.

Cole, io5 F.3d at 1482.

103. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 682.
104. An interesting point regarding cost-sharing in arbitration was made by an employment attor-

ney whom I interviewed. She noted that prior to the inclusion of cost-sharing provisions in employment arbitration agreements, employers routinely paid the entire cost of arbitration. This policy was
only changed due to a sentiment among those opposed to the agreements that such one-sided payment
further biased the arbitrators against employees, because the employers were paying the arbitrators'
full salary. Thus, the current line of criticism against cost-sharing provisions in such agreements leaves
employers in a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" type situation. Telephone Interview with
Anonymous Attorney (Dec. 2, 2002).
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arbitration of the FEHA claims. Enshrinement of the Cole factors into
California state
ees' rights with
uncontroversial
rived its criteria

law is a welcome development for safeguarding employrespect to FEHA and Title VII claims. It is also a fairly
tactic when applied to statutory rights, since Cole defrom Gilmer."
2.
Unconscionabiltyas a Defense Against Mandatory Arbitration
In the second part of its analysis in Armendariz, the court honed
California unconscionabilty law into a weapon that could be used against

mandatory arbitration agreements. The court first made a summary finding that the contract was a contract of adhesion and thereby supported a
finding of procedural unconscionability.'O
Moving on to substantive unconscionability, the court began by

summarizing typical disadvantages of arbitration for an employee, citing
the lack of discovery, waiver of the right to a jury trial, limited judicial
review, and the repeat player syndrome."° While the court did not explicitly declare that these features of arbitration alone give rise to substantive unconscionability, it implied that they go a long way toward establishing such a defense, especially if there is any other indication of
unfairness in an agreement. The court noted: "[g]iven the lack of choice
and the potential disadvantages that even a fair arbitration system can

105. Cole, io5 F.3d at 1482. In a 2003 case, Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979 (Cal. 2003), the

California Supreme Court took the more controversial step of extending the application of the
Cole/Armendariz factors to non-statutory claims. In Auto Stiegler, the plaintiff brought a common-law
claim for wrongful termination contrary to public policy, known in California as a "Tameny" claim.
See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 61o P.2d 1330 (Cal. i 9 8o). The defendant sought to compel arbitration pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause in the employment agreement. The court held that
even though the Tameny claim is judicially created, it is "almost by definition unwaivable" and that
the rationale of Cole extends "generally to unwaivable rights conferred for a public benefit." Auto
Stiegler,Inc., 63 P.3d at 987-88. The court then drew upon the fifth Cole/Armendariz factor, the imposition of arbitration costs on the employee, to exempt the Tameny claim from arbitration.
In dissent, Justice Brown argued that this was an unwarranted extension of the Cole/Armendariz
factors, and in contravention of the FAA. Id. at 997-98 (Brown, J., dissenting). Justice Brown explained that the rationale behind the Cole factors was to fulfill Congress's intent in creating certain
statutory rights that could not be waived by agreement or weakened by diverting them to arbitration.
Id. The Cole factors provide a procedural safeguard for the enforcement of these rights. However, this
means that Cole applied only to statutory rights, not to common law causes of action such as a Tameny
claim. Indeed, the FAA almost certainly precludes application of the Cole factors unless there is an
ascertainable Congressional intent to apply them, due to the FAA's "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration." Id. at 998. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit, which created the Cole factors, itself limited their
application to statutory rights in Brown v. Wheat First Securities, Inc., 257 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
The effect of Auto Stiegler is therefore to impose requirements upon arbitration agreements that were
not only unintended by Congress, but, through the FAA, actively preempted. 63 P.3d at 997 (Brown,
J., dissenting). Auto Stiegler provides a good indication of the California Supreme Court's willingness
to take an activist approach in striking down mandatory arbitration agreements.
Io6. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 69o.
io7. id.
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harbor for employees, we must be particularly attuned to claims that employers with superior bargaining power have imposed one-sided, ''sub8
stantively unconscionable terms as part of an arbitration agreement.
It is troubling that the court relied on typical features of arbitration
to support a finding of substantive unconscionability. Regardless of the
actual legitimacy of these arguments, all were dismissed per se grounds
for establishing substantive unconscionability by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Gilmer.'" For the Armendariz court to rely on them in finding the
agreement to be unfair is therefore inconsistent with the high court's
doctrine."' Granted, the Gilmer court did not give an unconditional
blessing to all forms of arbitration."' But nowhere did it sanction a finding that arbitration is typically unfair to plaintiff-employees.
Next, the Armendariz court addressed the fact that the agreement at
issue required the employees to arbitrate their wrongful termination
claims against the employer, but did not require the employer to arbitrate claims against the employees."2 The court found that these two factors in combination gave rise to substantive unconscionability because
the one-sidedness of the agreement put the employees at a disadvantage." 3
Citing two prior California cases, Kinney v. United HealthCareServices, Inc."' and Stirlen v. Supercuts, the court endorsed a rule that a
mandatory arbitration agreement must feature a "modicum of bilaterality"'' to avoid being substantively unconscionable. This rule forbids the
employer from imposing an obligation upon the employee to arbitrate
when it does not itself share the obligation, unless there is a reasonable
business justification for the disparity."6 The court noted that while "such
lack of mutuality does not render the contract illusory, i.e., lacking in muio8. d.
to9. The Gilmer Court held that, under the FAA, arbitration should be considered presumptively
fair unless the plaintiff can show otherwise. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 3033 (I9i). Therefore, a court ought not find typical characteristics of arbitration to be suggestive of
substantive unconscionability. Rather, the court may only look at the characteristics of the particular
arbitration proceedings being challenged.
iio. Of course, the California Supreme Court is not bound by United States Supreme Court
precedent when it is dealing exclusively with issues of state contract law. This is most likely why the
California Supreme Court has used unconscionability as a weapon against mandatory arbitration.
i i i. Indeed, the Cole requirements were derived from the minimum standards applicable to arbitration implicit in Gilmer. Cole, IO5 F.3d at 1467.
H2. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 69I.
I13. Id. at 692.
I 4. 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
IH5. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 69 I .
ss6. Id. at 692. This is the same rule used by the Mercuro court to invalidate the contract at issue
there.
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tual consideration ...in the context of an arbitration agreement imposed
by the 7employer on the employee, such a one-sided term is unconscionable.""
At once the most creative and troubling aspect of the opinion is the
court's attempt to defend this mutuality requirement in the face of a contrary Alabama Supreme Court case, Ex parte McNaughton,"5 and, more
importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings in Perry v. Thomas"9 and
2 ° In Perry, the Court held that:
Doctor'sAssociates v. Casarotto.'
A court may not... in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different
from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements
under state law. Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement
would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect
what we hold today the state legislature cannot.'2
Similarly, the Court held in Doctor's Associates that "[c]ourts may
not. . . invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only
to arbitration provisions ....
This point was also made by the Alabama
Supreme Court in Ex parte McNaughton.' 3 The McNaughton court,
faced with facts similar to those in Armendariz, declined to apply either
the Alabama doctrine of mutuality of remedy' 4 or the doctrine of unconscionability because it found that both approaches would rely on "the
uniqueness of the concept of arbitration [and would assign] a suspect
status to arbitration agreements... [thereby flying] in the face of Doctor's Associates."'25
The Armendariz court rejected the reasoning of McNaughton and
attempted to reconcile its holding with Doctor's Associates and Perry by
maintaining that it was not finding arbitration itself, but rather the disparity in the contract at issue, to be unconscionable. The court noted
that, "[i]t does not disfavor arbitration to hold that an employer may not

117. Id.
is8. 728 So. 2d 592 (Ala. 1998).
119. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).

120. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
121. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
122. 517 U.S. at 687.
123. 728 So. 2d at 598.
124. This equitable doctrine is used to reform or invalidate a contract that limits the form of remedy receivable by one party while allowing the other party the full range of remedies. This occurs, for
example, when one party is restricted to seeking specific performance but the other party is free to
seek money damages or specific performance in the case of breach. The Alabama Supreme Court refused to apply this doctrine, stating that arbitration is not a remedy but a forum. McNaughton, 728 So.
2d at 598.
125. Id.
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impose a system of arbitration on an employee that seeks to maximize
the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of arbitration for itself at
the employee's expense. '26

This argument, however sympathetic to the plight of plaintiffempl6yees, seems like a logical sleight of hand. The U.S. Supreme
Court's has mandated that the "uniqueness of arbitration agreements"
cannot provide a basis for a finding of unconscionability. It is not logically possible to abstain from considering the uniqueness of arbitration as
a basis for unconscionability, as required by Perry, while simultaneously
finding that factors unique to arbitration support a finding of unconscionability, as in Armendariz. Neither is the Armendariz court's argument that it is not the factors themselves, but rather the disparity in application of the factors to the parties, satisfying. To avoid singling out
arbitration for disfavor, it must be considered the equal of the judicial
system. Requiring each party to submit to two different yet equal systems
of dispute resolution cannot be considered disparate.'27 For example, in
Mercuro, Countrywide's attempt to send claims for injunctive relief to
the courts while sending other claims to arbitration cannot be found unconscionable under the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence, since both
systems are to be considered equal. There can be no "one-sidedness" resulting from the differing forums.
Griping about a problem is far easier than finding a solution. It is
therefore difficult to fault the California Supreme Court for concocting
such a resourceful antidote to the problem of mandatory arbitration.
Mandatory employment arbitration, as cases such as Mercuro demonstrate, is a problem which requires a more satisfactory solution than the
U.S. Supreme Court or the legislature appear willing to provide. Faced
with the pre-emptive FAA and a mightily pro-arbitration U.S. Supreme
Court, it is understandable that the California Supreme Court retreated
to the only province in which it is sovereign-state law-in order to find
a solution. The difficult question is whether this solution is apposite.
The most apparent problem with the California approach is that it
likely contravenes the FAA as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Perry, Doctor's Associates and Gilmer. Although the Armendariz decision may be insulated from U.S. Supreme Court review by virtue of its

126. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669,693 (Cal. 2000).
127. If this argument resonates with the historical jurisprudence of equal protection, it is perhaps
because the underlying reasoning is not so dissimilar. In both instances, the United States Supreme
Court has refused to acknowledge the empirical differences between two systems, relying instead on a
theoretical window-dressing.
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reliance on state unconscionability doctrine,"' Auto Steigler is not so in-

sulated and appears to be an unveiled assault upon the FAA's proarbitration policy. In both cases, it is unsettling for a state supreme court
to contravene the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress. Not only does this
tactic undermine the authority of the judicial hierarchy, but also the
credibility of the California court. It may also encourage forum-shopping
among employers.
Furthermore, reliance upon unconscionability doctrine as a means of
overturning a mandatory arbitration agreement leaves much to judicial
discretion. Judges will be free to uphold or invalidate mandatory arbitration agreements on the basis of personal conceptions of fairness. The
Armendariz court gives little guidance as to how one-sided an agreement
to arbitrate must be to be substantively unconscionable. And, although it
is not likely to be a big problem, some employers may be deterred from
hiring in California due to the unpredictability of employment disputes.'29
CONCLUSION

This Note has recognized two problems. The first is the larger problem of whether mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts
are fair and equitable to employees. As noted above, the answer to this
problem is not clearly discoverable through statistics or through anecdotal cases such as Mercuro. While the evidence discussed above may suggest that such clauses are at least potentially inequitable, the decision
about what to do about them is ultimately a political one properly made
by the legislature. Consequently, unless Congress elects to amend the
FAA, the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of that statute as permitting the use of pre-dispute mandatory agreements to arbitrate in employment contracts must stand.

128. It is somewhat unclear whether the Armendariz decision was appealable under Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (I975). Cox held that judgments of state courts that finally decide a
federal issue are immediately appealable when
the party seeking review here might prevail [in the state court] on the merits on nonfederal
grounds, thus rendering unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court, and where
reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation
on the relevant cause of action.
Id. at 482-83. The tricky question is whether the issue presented by the Armendariz decision is a federal or state one. If characterized as a decision pertaining to the FAA, it is federal and appealable, but
if characterized as an interpretation of state unconscionability doctrine, review ends at the state high
court level.
129. California is an exceptional state in terms of resources and business advantages. It is therefore
unlikely that an employer wishing to hire in California would be significantly deterred by the Armendariz rule. Quite possibly this truth informed the Armendariz court's judgment. However, other states
wishing to use the decision as a model may be more warranted in taking this factor into consideration.
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The second problem is the conflict between the California Supreme
Court's decision in Armendariz and the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in
Doctor's Associates. This incongruity can only be solved through an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, but it is initially unclear whether the
Armendariz decision could have been appealed under Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn.3 ' Cox held that judgments of state courts that finally decide a federal issue are immediately appealable when "the party seeking
review here might prevail [in the state court] on the merits on nonfederal
grounds, thus rendering unnecessary review of the federal issue by this
Court, and where reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be
preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of action ... 3,
The tricky question is whether the issue presented by the Armendariz
decision is a federal or state one. If characterized as a decision pertaining
to the FAA, it is federal and appealable, but if characterized as an interpretation of state unconscionability doctrine, review ends at the state
high court level.
This Note suggests that it is a federal issue, since the U.S. Supreme
Court explicitly stated in Doctor's Associates that the differences between the courts and arbitration cannot be used as a basis for finding a
contract unconscionable. The rule in Doctor's Associates was an interpretation of the FAA itself, and is therefore pre-emptive federal law.'32
Ultimately, mandatory employment arbitration law in California is
like Robert Penn Warren's single-bed blanket, shared by three folks:
Congress, the United States Supreme Court, and the California Supreme
Court. It has been pulled and hauled at by each, leaving some out in the
cold. Cases like Mercuro attest to the need for a solution, but the California Supreme Court's attempt to stretch the blanket may tear too much
at the fabric that holds the law together.

130. 420 U.S. 469 (I975).
131. Id. at 482-83.

132. A full discussion of the federalism issue, while fascinating, is unfortunately beyond the scope
of this Note.
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